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Abstract— The generalization of open and distributed systems 
and the dynamics of the environment make Information Systems 
(IS) and, consequently, its access rights management an 
increasingly complex problem. Even if support for this activity 
appears to be well handed by current sophisticated solutions, the 
definition and the exploitation of an access rights management 
framework appropriately adapted for a company remain 
challenging. This statement is explained mainly by the 
continuous growth of the diversity of stakeholders’ positions and 
by the criticality of the resources to protect. The SIM project, 
which stands for “Secure Identity Management”, addresses this 
problem. 
The objectives of our paper are twofold. First, to make rights 
management align closer to business objectives by providing an 
innovative approach that focuses on business goals for defining 
access policy. The ISO/IEC 15504 process-based assessment 
model has been preferred for that research. Indeed, the 
structured framework that it offers for the description of 
activities allows for the establishment of meaningful links with 
responsibilities concepts. Secondly, to automate the deployment 
of policies through the company IT infrastructure’s components 
and devices by defining a multi-agent system architecture that 
provides autonomy and adaptability. Free and open source 
components have been used for the prototyping phase. 
 
Index Terms— Identity Management, Multi-agent 
architecture, Policy Engineering, Responsibility model. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
NFORMATION Systems and rights management are 
becoming more and more complex. This is mainly due to 
the generalization of open systems, heterogeneous, distributed 
and dynamic environments and the growth and diversity of 
available solutions. In that context, defining and exploiting an 
access control policy that addresses both the diversity of the 
stakeholders’ statute (worker, employee or manager) and the 
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criticality of the resources to protect (public, secret, 
confidential) is challenging. This challenge is then 
complicated due to the perpetual evolution of the 
organization’s structure, the business strategy, the employee’s 
responsibilities, and even the legal requirements in effect. 
Solutions exist to associate rights to profiles and 
automatically apply those rights to all IS components and 
devices. These kinds of solutions (called IAM-Identity 
Management Solutions) are usually products with a 
preformatted architecture and, consequently, present 
difficulties in integration with the global IS solution of the 
company. 
At a functional layer, two major problems arise when trying 
to deal with these existing applications. First, they are 
principally based on the association of stakeholders to roles 
following the RBAC model [1] or one of its derivations [4, 5]. 
In practice, and specifically in large companies, these kinds of 
stakeholder-roles associations are often difficult to establish 
because of the need to define a strict and refined number of 
roles. Indeed, it is uncommon to identify two employees with 
exactly the same job profiles. A second problem that occurs in 
these solutions is that the calculation of access rights is made 
according to the value of the asset being protected, its 
vulnerability, and the existing threat. IT staff are normally 
assigned this task and they will use existing tools issued from 
the risk analysis domain to complete it. These methods 
calculate a risk profile and propose a solution for securing the 
asset without systematically validating it with the asset’s 
business owner. In that, the business owner has been given a 
solution without having had the possibility of optimizing the 
ratio “business need” / “proposed countermeasure”. 
Improving the way to define a more suitable IS access 
rights according to the business requirements is the goal of our 
research. We are attempting to do it by the means of policy. 
Policy is a concept that has already been largely discussed in 
scientific literature [6, 7, 8, 9]. Even if the majority of authors 
exploit it in the sense of a number of technical rules to be 
applied at a technical level [7, 8, 9], policy is also a more 
general concept used at the higher level of the company [6, 
10, 11] (for example, Basel II [10] may be seen as imposing 
strategic policies for the financial sector). Whichever way 
policy is perceived, we would point out that no common 
definition of it exists yet, nor for its content [11]. However, 
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one common component that is generally present in all 
definitions is the concept of “right”. Right [2, 3] is defined as: 
privileges that a subject can hold and exercise on an object. 
Later in the document [2], the author characterizes this 
privilege as an access privilege to the object. More conceptual 
components of the policy exist, specifically: responsibility, 
obligation [2, 3, 9, 12], delegation [9], and commitment. 
Those components are much less systematically integrated in 
the definition but it has been proven that they may play an 
important role in refining the engineering of policy. With the 
desire to keep this paper didactic and based on a common 
understanding of the organization’s artifacts, our work will be 
grounded on process-based organization. 
At a technical layer, two observations are made: first, 
existing IAM solutions are usually (or generally) monolithic, 
proprietary and non-flexible. “Identity and access 
management defined” [13] explains that the complexity of 
integrating the components of IAM solutions will cause 60 
percent of enterprises to choose product suites that are owned 
or licensed by, and supported through, one vendor. Secondly, 
the development of a Federated Identity Management (FIM) is 
a cornerstone concept that increases organizational 
cooperation by sharing each other's resources and information. 
However, implementing such a technology is challenging 
because of the difficulty in integrating heterogeneous 
applications – and consequently technologies - to 
heterogeneous organizations. To address this concern, our 
approach is based on the development of an open, agent-based 
solution. Advantages of this technology are the autonomy and 
the rapid and accurate adaptability according the usage 
constraints. 
With our approach, we aim to offer a new manner to 
improve the way of defining a more suitable IS access rights 
according to the business needs and deploying these rights to 
their heterogeneous IS components. 
 
 
Figure 1: Identity management life cycle 
As shown on Fig.1, identity management is an activity that 
could be achieved following a life cycle approach. First results 
of our research attempt to bring innovation to parts “Policy 
Engineering” and “Policy Deployment”. 
Section 2 of this paper proposes a conceptual model that 
integrates process concepts and responsibility components. 
The Section 3 presents the agent based approach for deploying 
policy. Section 4 introduces future work and conclusions.  
II. PROCESS-ORIENTED POLICY ENGINEERING 
A. Defining policy 
This second section focuses on defining access control 
policies from the organizational structure. As explained in 
first section, the innovative research of this policy engineering 
activity is to be centred mainly on business needs. Indeed, 
data access is an important concept for IT security. Access 
policies that enforce access right must take into account both:  
- the strict restriction of access for stakeholders to data ; 
- the guarantee that the business goal can still be achieve 
in a efficient way. 
To perform this policy engineering activity, we have 
oriented our research toward a particular type of company 
where process-based approaches are in use. Other frameworks 
also have been chosen such as the matrix approach or the 
pyramidal one. Future extension of this work could be done 
for those alternative approaches [15], even if process based 
approaches for formalizing the company’s activity exists for a 
long time, a number of literature texts and norms deal with it. 
For example, in [16] Ruth Sara Savén describes a Business 
Process as a combination of a set of activities within an 
enterprise with a structure describing their logical order and 
dependence whose objective is to produce a desired result. In 
CEN/ENV 12204 [17] a business process is defined as a 
partially ordered set of enterprise activities which can be 
executed to realize a given objective of an enterprise or a part 
of an enterprise to achieve some desired end-result. Among 
existing process formalisms, the standard ISO 9000 [24] 
presents interesting perspectives in that it considers a process 
as a set of interrelated or interacting activities, which 
transforms inputs into outputs. Moreover ISO/IEC 15504 [18] 
confers a structural framework for describing a process and 
maturity model for process evaluation. Our work is based on 
the establishment of a link between the concepts from 
ISO/IEC 15504 and from the components which we will now 
introduce. 
The project SIM aims to define policies that are a best fit 
for business goals and requirements. This is a basic 
prerequisite of business-IT alignment. These goals and 
requirements are translated according to ISO/IEC 15504 with 
process’s concepts that are: 
- Purposes, which describes a process; 
- Outcome, which is an observable result of a process. It 
is an artefact, a significant change of state or the 
meeting of specified constraints, 
- Base practice, which is an activity that, when 
consistently performed, contributes to achieving a 
specific process outcome; 
- Work product, which is an artefact associated with the 
execution of a process. It can be input (required for 
outcome achievement) or output (result from outcome 
achievement). 
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Processes are observable through different outcomes and 
are achieved by using resources, base practices and work 
products. 
ISO/IEC 15504 does not specifically addresses capability 
and accountability, which are the components of the 
responsibilities concepts necessary to achieve base practices. 
Its maturity model permits it to measure the maturity level of 
the processes and level 2 of this model seems adequate to deal 
with responsibility. Even if the standard doesn’t discuss it, we 
have decided to orient our work according to the description 
of the responsibility that has been published in [15]: the 
Responsibility is a set of capabilities, accountabilities and 
commitment linked to a stakeholder that performs base 
practices. 
- Capability, which describes the quality of having the 
requisite qualities or resources to achieve a task; 
- Accountability, which describes the state of being 
answerable about the achievement of a task. 
- Commitment, which is the engagement of a stakeholder 
to fulfil a task and the assurance he will do it. 
Note that this pledge often has a character of right and an 
obligation to fulfil this action. Commitment may be declined 
under different perspectives, such as the willingness of social 
actors to give their energy and loyalty to social systems or an 
affective attachment to an organization apart from the purely 
instrumental worth of the relationship [19]. For James G. 
March and Johan P. Olsen [20], rules that manage a system 
exist because they work well and provide better solutions than 
their alternative. They also observe that peoples’ moral 
commitment is a condition for the existence of a common 
interpretation of rules. According to that statement and by 
extrapolating “rules” to stakeholders’ capabilities and 
accountabilities, commitment seems to be an unavoidable 
component. 
Defining policies from business processes are obtained, in 
our research, by combining responsibilities and components to 
ISO/IEC 15504 concepts. We observe quite naturally that 
first, the Input Work product is a right for a stakeholder to 
perform an activity; it is then combined with the Capability. 
Secondly, the Output Work product is a stakeholder’ 
obligation at the issue of the activity. We combine it with 
Accountability. Fig.2 illustrates this issue. Both 
responsibilities’ components Capability and Accountability 
are strongly linked to each other [15] in that accountability of 
a role or a person permits us to deduce capability of another 
role or person and conversely a capability stems from 
accountability (e.g.: The capability “An engineer has access to 
a specific file” stems from the accountability “An engineer has 
to share a specific file with another engineer”). 
Fig.3 shows at a more global point of view of this 
conceptual connection between ISO/IEC 15504 and Identity 
Management concepts. The identity management model is 
composed of responsibilities associated to role, which are 
given to specific persons. 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between accountability and 
capability responsibilities 
- Role: which describes a role of a person in the 
organization; 
- Person: which describes a person who interacts with 
the organisation and its processes. 
A policy is applicable to software such as directory (LDAP, 
Microsoft Active Directory…) file systems (NTFS, UFS…) 
and hardware like firewalls or gateways. 
Each responsibility is linked with a role, which describes 
the role of a person in the organisation (role should not be 
confused with the function, for example a engineer (function) 
can be project manager and developer (roles)). 
Of course, a person can be linked to one or more roles. The 
role of a person permits us to define the access policy for that 
person; for example to grant access permission to the project 
management folder on the organisation’s fileserver. By being 
linked to a role, a person has to give his/her commitment. 
 
 
Figure 3: ISO/IEC 15504 and Identity management 
models 
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In practice, we have developing and extending modules in 
order to be able to define the different ISO/IEC 15504 and 
Identity management concepts into an open-source groupware 
called eGroupWare [14]. 
When using this application, the business owner (or the 
person in charge of the system) has to set up the different 
organisational processes as “process templates”. A “process 
template” will describe a generic process set up in the 
organisation, for example the project management process, 
which describes all of the essential project management steps. 
In this kind of template-process, concepts are fully generic 
and responsibilities are only linked to roles. 
In order to instantiate a generic process into a specific 
process (e.g.: project management of the SIM project), each 
generic concept of this process is instantiated (process, 
outcomes, base practices, work products, responsibilities and 
roles) and roles are given to specific organisation members. 
With all of these parameters, SIM will be able to deduce a 
set of policies (hardware-applicable or not). This policy 
deduction will be developed in our future work. 
B. Case study 
To illustrate the close relation between the ISO/IEC 15504 
concepts and identity management concepts we describe an 
example below that is a description of a part of the Process 
Assessment Model (PAM) of the project management process 
MAN3 as defined in the ISO/IEC 15504 model. Table.I shows 
the different concepts linked to the outcome: “3) the tasks and 
resources necessary to complete the work are sized and 
estimated;”. 
TABLE I: 
MAIN CONCEPTS OF THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
ISO/IEC 15504-5:2006 ? MAN.3 Project management 
Purpose 
The purpose of the Project management process is to 
identify, establish, co-ordinate, and monitor the 
activities, tasks and resources necessary for a project to 
produce a product and/or service, in the context of the 
project’s requirements and constraints. 
Outcomes 
… 
3) the tasks and resources necessary to complete the 
work are sized and estimated; 
… 
Base Practices 
… 
MAN.3.BP4: Determine and maintain estimates for 
project attributes. Define and maintain baselines for 
project attributes. [Outcome: 2,3] 
MAN.3.BP5: Define project activities and tasks. Identify 
project activities and tasks according to defined project 
life cycle, and define dependencies between them. 
[Outcome: 3] 
… 
Workproducts 
inputs 
… 
03-06 Process performance data [Outcome: 3,7] 
08-12 Project plan [Outcome: 3, 6, 7] 
10-01 Life cycle model [Outcome: 1, 3, 4, 5] 
14-06 Schedule [Outcome: 1, 3] 
… 
Workproducts 
output 
… 
08-12 Project plan [Outcome: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5] 
14-06 Schedule [Outcome: 5] 
… 
 
In the example detailed in Fig.4, we assume that each 
person is responsible of an outcome and has accepted this 
mission (the commitment). For example, the Outcome’s 
responsible (OR) 3, to fully realise the activity, must have the 
capability (the right) to access to the “Process performance 
data”, “Project plan”, “Life cycle model” and “Schedule” 
resources. These elements are defined and linked to the Input 
Workproducts in the process definition.   
The “schedule” capabilities for the OR3 generate 
obligations for another resource in the organisation. For 
example, OR3 has the obligation to provide the capabilities to 
OR3 on “Input Workproducts”. In our case, it can be 
translated by a validation of an authorisation request (induced 
by this “schedule” capability). 
For the “project plan”, OR3 has, at the same time, a 
capability, but has also an obligation to participate at the 
elaboration of this output work product. In the same idea, 
OR1 and OR5 have also accountabilities on the “project plan”. 
 
Figure 4: Responsibility decomposition of the outcome 3 
In practice, these concepts are entered into the tool via 
eGroupWare-based modules (Process, Outcomes, Base 
practices and Work products). Each module permits us to link 
concepts to others; thus outcomes are linked to processes, and 
base practices and work products are linked to outcomes. The 
first step, as described above, is to enter the generic concepts 
that correspond to a generic description of a process. Once 
this step is realized, via the SIM module, it becomes possible 
to have a process cartography showing a process and its 
purpose, the linked outcomes, and relative base practices and 
work products. 
Fig.5 represents the cartography of the whole process of 
ISO/IEC 15504-5:2006: MAN.3 Project management, with 
the concepts of responsibilities generated by SIM. These 
concepts will be called generic concepts, as the represented 
process is a “generic” process, responsibilities on different 
base practices are defined for roles. 
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Figure 5: SIM module "Process cartography" 
For each role, two kinds of responsibility are defined: 
capability and accountability. These responsibilities describe 
the role’s rights and obligations for a given base practice. 
Fig.6 and Fig.7 show how responsibilities are entered. A 
capability is assigned to a role and needs an action, a resource 
and a mode (e.g.: [OR3] Outcome 3 responsible has this 
capability: access to 14-06 Schedule in read mode). 
 
Figure 6: Capability details form 
Accountability is assigned to a role and defined by an 
action and a resource (e.g.: [OR3] Outcome 3 responsible has 
this accountability: complete 08-12 Project plan). An 
accountability can create inherent capabilities; in order to 
complete an action, it is sometimes necessary to have access 
to something. In the case study example, the accountability 
complete 08-12 Project plan causes the capability Access to 
08-12 Project in write mode; and it will be necessary to have 
permission to write to the file in order to be complete. 
 
Figure 7: Accountability details form 
From the model we defined, it’s possible to generate 
generic policies that use roles in order to obtain enforceable 
policies and a transformation from business model to XACML 
[25] is done. XACML stands for eXtensible Access Control 
Markup Language. It’s a declarative access control policy 
language implemented in XML and a processing model 
describing how to interpret the policies. The latest version 2.0 
[26] was ratified by OASIS standards organization [27] on 1 
February 2005; XACML 3.0 standard is not finalized yet. For 
this project, only the policies declaration part of XACML is 
used in order to store and disseminate policies through the 
system. A policy obtained from a generic process would not 
be directly applicable because it concerns roles, not physical 
persons. Using this generic process, it’s possible to instantiate 
a specific process: a project management process. For 
example: the project management of the SIM project. In this 
instantiate process, roles are assigned to physical persons. In 
this example, Pierre Durand (defined into SIM using 
appropriate module: Addressbook) is assigned to the role 
OR3. 
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Figure 8: Instantiated responsibilities details 
Fig.8 shows how responsibilities are assigned to a person 
(here: Pierre Durand). The responsibility of Pierre Durand is 
composed by accountabilities and capabilities described by the 
generic process model and some accountabilities and 
capabilities are added in order to customize the model to the 
needs (for example the capability Access to Budget Lines in 
Read mode). Knowing his capabilities and accountabilities, he 
can commit himself to realize a defined task.  
The commitment means that Pierre Durand has accepted his 
responsibility according to the capabilities and 
accountabilities. Consequently it becomes possible to generate 
specific policies (specific standings for enforceable policies). 
The capabilities will be turned into XACML policies. From 
the example above, the capability “Access to 14-06 Schedule 
in Read mode” will be changed into XACML policy (Fig.9). 
Pierre Durand (subject) has to obtain read right (action) access 
on a resource called 14-06 Schedule (resource). Subject, 
actions and resources details are stored on a database. In this 
example, we assume that Pierre Durand’s addressbook table 
ID (contact_id) is 42. 
 
 
Figure 9: XACML policy example 
Using all of the defined capabilities of each instantiated 
process, SIM will be able to generate a full set of policies, 
which will be transferred to the agent-based policy 
deployment. 
III. AGENT-BASED POLICY DEPLOYMENT 
We need a means to apply policies in terms of specific 
concrete rules. The communication between a component 
managing the policies resulting in process-oriented policy 
engineering and the devices which must apply concrete rules 
should be provided by a standardized protocol such as SNMP 
[30], COPS [28] or NETCONF [29]. Another solution is to 
use multi-agent based communications.  
SNMP is a simple network management protocol designed 
by the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force). An SNMP-
managed network consists of three key components: (i) a 
network management station (NMS) executing applications 
that monitor and control managed devices, (ii) the managed 
devices i.e. network nodes that we want to manage and (iii) 
SNMP agents which are network-management software 
modules residing in managed devices. 
COPS is a signaling protocol designed by the IETF for 
exchanging policy information between a policy server 
(Policy Decision Point or PDP) and its clients (Policy 
Enforcement Points or PEP). It is a simple query and response 
protocol that can be used to send configuration requests and 
return policy decisions to enforce. 
NETCONF is a network management protocol standardized 
by the IETF. The NETCONF protocol provides mechanisms 
to install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network 
devices. It also can perform some monitoring functions. It 
uses an Extensible Markup Language (XML) based data 
encoding for the configuration data as well as the protocol 
messages. The NETCONF protocol operations are realized on 
top of a simple Remote Procedure Call (RPC) layer. 
If we take the terms defined by COPS, these protocols 
could be used to send messages between a PDP and some 
PEP. These protocols are secured and permit a certain quality 
of service. But they don't specify how a PEP transforms an 
abstract policy sent by the PDP into a concrete rule. These 
solutions neither define architecture and functions of PDP and 
PEP. These components must not only send messages but also 
“work together” to apply concrete rules on devices. That's 
why we think that the use of a Multi-Agent System (MAS) is 
a solution because it provides autonomous entities that can be 
collaborative. A Multi-Agent System is composed of several 
agents, capable of a mutual interaction which can be in the 
form of message passing or the production of changes in their 
common environment [21]. Agents are pro-active, reactive 
and socially autonomous entities able to exhibit organized 
activity, in order to meet their designed objectives, by 
eventually interacting with users. Agents are collaborative by 
being able to commit themselves to the society or/and another 
agent [22]. So, if we consider that each technical module 
(firewall, fileserver, LDAP directory, etc.) is interfaced with 
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an agent, all agents will collaborate in order to apply a set of 
common policies. 
 
 
Figure 10: Multi-Agent System framework 
We propose a Multi-Agent System gathering three types of 
agents to build the SIM's technical architecture as shown in 
Fig.10. Each device (technical module) is interfaced with an 
agent called PEP for Policy Enforcement Point. The PEP 
communicates with an agent called PDP (for Policy Decision 
Point) whose goal is to retrieve PEP agents and distributing 
policy to be applied. At last, the PIE agent (Policy 
Instantiation Engine) interfaces with the policy base in order 
to be aware of new policies to apply. We give main 
functionalities of each of the kinds of agents in the following 
sections. 
A. Policy Instantiation Engine 
This is the interface between the policies and the agents, 
between the transformation of the business process definition 
and its deployment. PIE agents detect when new policies are 
available and must be applied or when some policies have 
been modified or deleted. At this moment, it sends requests to 
add, modify or delete some policies to the PDP. For that, it 
must be able to make difference between new and previous 
organisation configuration by producing messages asking to 
add, modify or delete policies. 
B. Policy Decision Point 
The PDP's architecture is shown in Fig.11. There are two 
main modules: the policy analysis and the component 
configuration mapper. The policy analysis module has to 
perform a variety of validation checks. 
First, it verifies the syntax of the policy specification 
provided by a PIE. This module will then verify that the newly 
received policies are consistent with current applied rules 
(coming from the policy status base). A set of policies will be 
consistent if it can be shown that no contradictory policies will 
ever be found in a SIM system. The user will be able to 
choose the system behavior if a conflict is detected. For the 
moment, the old rules that derivate from the previous policy 
are canceled and the newly received policy that contradicts the 
applied rules.  
The policy analysis module communicates with a “policy 
rules status” database. This database stores the newly received 
policies and their current status (in progress, not applicable, 
by-passed, enforced, removed…). In addition, the module 
should detect rules that cannot be enforced due to a lack of 
PEP. As a consequence a PDP should be aware of the 
different managed PEPs. 
For this reason, the PDP agent is helped by a Facilitator 
agent. This agent manages the network topology by retrieving 
PEP agents according to their localisation (devices registered 
with an IP address or MAC address) or according to actions 
they could apply and their type (firewall, fileserver, etc.). For 
this, the Facilitator uses white pages and yellow pages 
services. 
 
 
Figure 11: Policy Decision Point architecture 
The Component Configuration Mapper must state in detail 
which kind of actions need to be taken by which kind of 
network devices/applications. This module receives high level 
policies and generates generic format policies for each type of 
PEP (router, firewall, IDS…). For that, it asks the Facilitator 
to determine what PEPs are impacted by the policies update 
by mapping a set of possible actions to the current network 
components capabilities.  
If some rules are not applicable, the component 
configuration mapper notifies the policy analysis module. This 
one will update the policy rules status. Problematic rules will 
be passed by, and their status in the “policy status” database 
will change from “in progress” to “by-passed”. Then the 
corresponding policies are sent to the concerned PEP. 
C. Policy Enforcement Point 
A PEP agent must manage each device that is part of SIM’s 
technical layer. Agents are specific according to the kind of 
devices or the kind of services that the device offers. It is 
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specific in order to know how to transform policies 
represented in an abstract format (XACML [23] in our case) 
for applicable scripts or rules. Fig.12 shows the PEP's 
architecture. A PEP is composed of three modules which are 
referred to as monitoring, observation and enforcement. 
The monitoring module controls the PEP actions and stores 
all relevant actions/events. It receives abstract policy from the 
PDP and chooses which action and parameters must be 
executed to apply the policy. Then, the enforcement module 
launches this local appropriate action mechanism by applying 
the selected script. The progress of the operations can be 
provided to the Observation module. This last module 
performs periodically, or during a script execution, 
measurements to evaluate the current state of the PEP. But this 
is also the module through which an audit could be done by 
sending feedback to the Audit Correlation Engine (ACE). 
 
 
Figure 12: Policy Enforcement Point architecture 
Let us take the policy example from Fig.9 permitting the 
user “42” to read the resource “14-06 Schedule”. The PEP 
interfacing with a UNIX-like fileserver registered the 
“chmod” action. So it will construct its script to execute with 
elements from the policy: the permission to read will be 
transformed into '+r'. If we consider that user “42” is not the 
owner of the file, the command to execute will be “chmod a+r 
14-06 Schedule”and the enforcement module of the PEP will 
execute it. The observation module will perform 
measurements and feedback information concerning the 
fileserver rules. In this particular case and for this resource, it 
will send a policy saying that all users are permitted to read 
the “14-06 Schedule” resource and not only the user “42”.  
To summarize, the use of a multi-agent system framework 
gives PIE, PDP and PEP the ability to cooperate and 
communicate between themselves in order to implements 
policies. It also provides flexibility, openness and 
heterogeneity because when we decide to add a new PEP, we 
just have to provide the agent able to concretely apply the 
policies. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper introduces the SIM approach, an innovative 
environment for defining and deploying policies in a 
heterogeneous environment. SIM facilitates the rights 
management by using a process approach based on business 
goals. This business-oriented approach is facilitated by the 
conjunctive use of the ISO/IEC 15504 and identity 
management concepts. The set of policies resulting of this 
engineering can be deployed using a multi-agent system. For 
example, agents collaborate in order to send abstract policies 
to each device concerned and to transform and implement 
them concretely on each system by executing scripts on a 
fileserver or adding rules for a firewall. This solution provides 
heterogeneity, flexibility and openness because of facilitator 
registering agents and the same abstract policies format used 
between agents. Agents deploy common rules but the 
administrator can modify system configurations directly. 
Current and future work will focus on the enhancement of 
the approach in the following domains shown in Fig.1: the 
“Policy Audit” and in the “Policy Transformation”. 
Concerning the “Policy Audit”, in order to avoid a difference 
between the organisational point of view and the system 
configuration point of view, we plan to give agents the ability 
to do an audit on their system on feed-back deployed policies 
to compare with the policies coming from the engineering 
activities. Deeper work in the “Policy Transformation” will 
also be conducted in order to develop a policy deduction 
strategy from the organisational layer to the technical one. 
Future works will also be concerned with the 
communication between agents and how to make them secure. 
We plan to use the JADE framework which uses the FIPA-
ACL message. The main attributes are the sender, the 
receiver, the language and the protocol used and the content of 
the message. We have to choose the language and then define 
the protocol that the agents will follow in order to deploy a set 
of policies and to audit applied rules. Next, we will improve 
the message structure by adding certificate information as in 
[31] in order to fill the security gap. 
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